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INTRODUCTION
With the possible exception of John Marshall, the Justice most frequently
quoted by legal scholars is almost certainly Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Following that practice, I begin with an appropriate Holmesian injunction:
our “business as thinkers is to make plainer the way from some thing to the
whole of things.”1 Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is to suggest that
† Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School. The Author would like to
thank Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen J. Ellmann, Brandt Goldstein, Lisa Grumet, Alfred S.
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recent Supreme Court decisions construing three Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “make plainer” some salient aspects of a particularly important
“whole”—namely, the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.
I. THREE FEDERAL RULES
A. Rule 56
In 1986, the Rehnquist Court decided three cases construing Rule 56
that encouraged motions for summary judgment and made it easier for
defendants to prevail on these motions.2 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett allowed
defendants to succeed at summary judgment without presenting evidence
negating plaintiffs’ allegations.3 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp. required that plaintiffs’ factual allegations meet a plausibility
standard and thereby narrowed the reasonable inference rule favoring nonmoving parties.4 Finally, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. imposed a higher
evidentiary standard on plaintiffs alleging claims requiring “clear and
convincing” proof and, in effect, gave courts the option to weigh plaintiffs’
evidence and to find it insufficient to prevent summary judgment.5
Subsequently, in Scott v. Harris, the Roberts Court further widened the
path to summary judgment by authorizing courts to weigh evidence in a
broader range of cases and give dispositive credence to some items while
dismissing others.6 In this case, the Court found that a videotape of the

Konefsky, Michael Perlin, and the members of the New York Law School Faculty Workshop for
their helpful comments, and Michael McCarthy and Danae Kapralos for their research assistance.
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
29, 30 (1921).
2 See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (discussing the impact of the “Supreme Court ‘trilogy’” of cases,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., and Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, on the use of summary judgment).
3 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (explaining that the moving party must point out only an absence
of evidence supporting an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case to succeed at summary
judgment).
4 475 U.S. 574, 595-97 (1986) (finding that petitioners’ conduct did not give rise to an inference of conspiracy given that the evidence showed no “plausible” motive to engage in a conspiracy).
5 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (holding that “in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden”
for the relevant claim).
6 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record[,] . . . a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
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incident in question “blatantly contradicted” the plaintiff ’s testimony “so
that no reasonable jury could believe” him.7 Compounding the already
dubious nature of the Court’s decision, a subsequent study found that a
significant minority of people viewing the same videotape disagreed with
the Court’s interpretation, suggesting that the tape contained ambiguities
that should have made the issue a jury question.8 Indeed, strengthening that
conclusion, the study also showed that perceptions of the tape’s significance
varied by race, income level, and political and ideological commitments.9
B. Rule 8
Addressing Rule 8, and going well beyond the restrictive efforts of the
Rehnquist Court, the Roberts Court substantially heightened pleading
requirements in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly10 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.11 As it
had been understood since its adoption in 1938, Rule 8 embodied the basic
principle of “notice pleading” that the Federal Rules established, and it
required only “a short and plain statement” of a plaintiff ’s claim. Consequently, for almost half a century, the Court held that a complaint “should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.”12 Reinterpreting the rule and discarding precedent, Twombly and Iqbal now require
plaintiffs to plead facts that show a “plausible” claim and promise a “reasonable” possibility of success.13
These decisions not only create a more demanding standard but also
invite a relatively subjective application. Judges, Iqbal announced, should
apply the higher standard by relying on their “judicial experience and
common sense.”14 The subjective nature of the new test and its implicit
7
8

Id. at 380.
Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 864-66 (2009).
9 See id. at 867-70, 879-80 (finding that those individuals who disagreed with the Court “were
connected by a core of identity-defining characteristics”).
10 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
11 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
12 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); accord, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (referencing Conley for the proposition that Rule 8 establishes a “simplified
notice pleading” standard intended only to give defendants “fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that federal courts must apply Conley’s liberal notice pleading
standard to civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under § 1983).
13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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invitation for courts to intrude even more deeply into jury functions are
apparent: in both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court disregarded possible factual
scenarios that would have made the defendants’ actions unlawful.15 Strikingly,
Iqbal rejected the “plausibility” of the plaintiffs’ allegations simply because
five of the nine Justices were willing to imagine “more likely explanations”
for the defendants’ behavior than the unlawful conspiracy that the plaintiff
alleged.16
C. Rule 23
Finally, the Roberts Court made the requirements for certifying class
actions under Rule 23 more demanding. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
construed Rule 23(a) to impose on plaintiffs the burden of showing a
significantly higher level of “commonality” in an identified class than
previously required.17 Indeed, its method of analysis—probing proposed
commonalities for every possible “dissimilarity” that could be teased out—
suggested an approach designed to defeat a wide range of class actions at
the certification stage.
The Court continued this trend in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, which relied
almost exclusively on Wal-Mart and declared that the “rigorous analysis”
required under Rule 23(a) was similarly required under Rule 23(b)(3).18
More restrictively, it held that the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) could not be met unless plaintiffs could show that “damages are
capable of measurement on a classwide basis” and then rejected the plaintiff’s
proposed methodology for calculating classwide damages as insufficiently
“rigorous.”19

15 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 336 & n.191 (2013) (“The
Court’s opinions in both Twombly and Iqbal offered innocent explanations for the defendants’
conduct; these explanations were employed in a manner akin to judicial fact-finding.” (citations
omitted)).
16 556 U.S. at 681.
17 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (explaining that commonality requires a “common contention . . . capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke”). See
generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice,
93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013) (discussing the restrictive commonality reasoning employed by the
Court in Wal-Mart).
18 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).
19 Id. at 1433 (citing Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014]

From the Particular to the General

1735

II. THREE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
A. Innovative Interpretation
These decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56 share three common
characteristics. The first is their highly questionable legal foundation. The
decisions were not based on changes in the text of the rules or their original
meanings. Although the Federal Rules have been amended on numerous
occasions, the relevant standards in these three rules have never been
substantively altered since their adoption.
The Court’s 1986 trilogy of summary judgment decisions came almost a
quarter of a century after Rule 56 had been last amended. These 1963
amendments made few changes to the rule and no revisions whatsoever in
the standard it had established for granting summary judgment.20 Thus, the
standard stood untouched when the Court issued its summary judgment
trilogy in 1986, and no subsequent amendment altered that standard in a
way that could justify Scott.
Similarly, the Roberts Court’s decisions addressing Rules 23(a) and
23(b)(3) construed language that had not been altered since its initial
adoption in 1966. The 1966 amendments rewrote Rule 23(a) to identify
characteristics that were “necessary but not sufficient” for class actions and
reworked Rule 23(b) to define additional conditions that justified three
different types of class actions.21 One of the principal purposes of the
amendments was to make the requirements for class actions less “abstract”
and the class action form more widely available.22 Moreover, the Advisory
Committee stated explicitly that, where “questions common to the class
predominate,” an action under subsection (b)(3) “may remain” as a class
action “despite the need, if liability is found, for a separate determination of
the damages suffered by individuals within the class.”23 Thus, contrary to
the reasoning in Comcast, Rule 23(b)(3) was not intended to require that
damages calculations be part of the predominance requirement analysis.
When the 1966 amendments spurred an increasing number of class actions
and gave rise to a variety of new problems, Rule 23 was altered to tighten
20 The standard for summary judgment appeared in subsection (c) from 1938 until 2010,
when it was moved to subsection (a); the Committee Notes on Rules stated that the “standard for
granting summary judgment remains unchanged.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) advisory committee’s
note to the 2010 amendments.
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendments; see also A.
Benjamin Spencer, supra note 17, at 450-51 (discussing the origins of Rule 23 and its new features).
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendments.
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendments.
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some procedures and ensure greater fairness to class members.24 However,
none of these post-1966 amendments changed the relevant text of subsections (a) and (b). Amendments in 1998 added certain interlocutory appeal
provisions,25 and more substantial changes in 2003 modified subsections (c)
and (e) and added new subsections (g) and (h). These latter amendments
altered certain timing and notice provisions, deleted language authorizing
conditional class certification, expanded the process for review of proposed
settlements, and provided for more rigorous scrutiny of class counsel and
attorneys’ fees.26 However, none of these amendments altered the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
Similarly, the Court’s decisions redefining pleading standards under
Rule 8 changed the meaning of a textual provision that had never been
substantively altered. The few minor amendments to the rule made over the
years were consistently identified as “technical” or “stylistic only.”27
Two conclusions about the Court’s recent decisions addressing Rules 8,
23, and 56 are warranted. First, none of the decisions were based on any
alterations in either the relevant text of the rules or their original meaning.
Indeed, in imposing a plausibility requirement for pleadings, Twombly and
Iqbal not only departed from the text and original understanding of Rule 8
but also rejected hundreds of years of legal practice defining the nature of
the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.28 Second, the decisions
departed from the Court’s own precedents.29 Twombly was particularly
24
25

E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (2009); id. (2003); id. (1998).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to the 1998 amendments (describing
the addition of Rule 23(f) granting interlocutory appeals for class certification decisions).
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendments; see also
Richard Marcus, Shoes That Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 641-44 (2013)
(discussing the evolution of Rule 23 and the increasing attention Rule 23 garnered after class
action litigation, especially asbestos mass tort litigation, became popular in the 1990s).
27 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8 advisory committee’s notes to the 1987 & 2007 amendments.
28 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 53 (2008) (“[N]othing in the repertoire of legalism could have decided [Twombly], especially in favor of the position in the majority
opinion . . . .”); Miller, supra, note 15, at 333-34 (“The Court essentially rewrote Rule 8 without
anyone’s assistance or any pretense of honoring the statutorily prescribed—and far more transparent
and democratic—rulemaking process.” (footnotes omitted)).
29 Compare Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982) (noting that a class of
persons suffering the same injury as an individual will have claims that share common questions of
law or fact with the individual’s claim), and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60
(1970) (rejecting the argument that the nonmoving party must come forward with an affidavit
asserting the fact relied on to avoid summary judgment), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (citing Falcon for the proposition that commonality requires that the class
members suffer the same injury), and Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (“Rule
56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own
affidavits . . . designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”). See generally
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blunt, dismissing the Court’s long-established interpretation as nothing but
“an incomplete, negative gloss” that was “best forgotten.”30 Arthur Miller
concluded that the Court’s decisions “essentially rewrote Rule 8” while
“unilaterally ‘rewriting’ Rule 56” and that “[n]othing in the language of Rule
23(a)(2), the provision’s history, or prior jurisprudence justifies” the Court’s
conclusions in Wal-Mart.31
The changes the Court made in the construction of those rules, moreover,
were particularly dubious because the Justices are bound by the Federal
Rules as written and adopted.32 Indeed, the Rehnquist Court repeatedly
acknowledged this structural separation-of-powers principle. Any change in
Rule 8, it declared unanimously in 1993, “must be obtained by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”33 It reaffirmed
that principle six years later when addressing class actions: “The nub of our
position is that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its
adoption, and that we are not free to alter it except through the process
prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.”34

Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward
Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 620 (2004) (noting that evidence
suggests summary judgment became increasingly important in the 1970s due to changes in the
“nature and volume of federal litigation”).
30 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (rejecting the rule of Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
31 Miller, supra note 15, at 333, 310, 319-20. Many others agree. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at
578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion “is the first by any Member of this
Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation”); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 601 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“If the Court intends
to give every judge hearing a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of
determining if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not, it is
overturning settled law.”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (“[T]he Court’s approach is thoroughly new.”).
32 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1681-89 (2004) (describing the binding power of the Federal Rules and citing
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 & n.14, 392 (1989), for the proposition that rulemaking
is not a judicial power).
33 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993).
34 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999). See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox
of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. P A. L. REV. 1099, 1119-20
(2002) (arguing that the rulemaking process serves as a constraint upon judicial interpretation that
strays from the text of the Rules).
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B. Practical Impact
The second shared characteristic of the decisions construing these three
Federal Rules is the practical social consequences they bring. All promise to
discourage suits, burden plaintiffs, and defeat large numbers of claims.35
They also promise to defeat those claims more quickly and with much less
cost to defendants.36
The Rule 56 decisions often relieve defendants of the need to present
evidence, and they allow courts to evaluate the record more exactingly and
deny the existence of “genuine” factual disputes more easily.37 They authorize
courts to disregard and, in effect, weigh evidence and make subjective
judgments as to both the “plausibility” of claims and the subjective motives
of defendants. While the impact of the decisions has varied, evidence
suggests that the trilogy significantly changed litigation practice in the
lower federal courts and encouraged wider use of summary judgment.38 One
study found that between 1975 and 2000 summary judgment motions in the
federal courts nearly doubled and that courts granted them twice as often as
they had in the past.39 Other studies have found that such motions have

35 Insofar as the rulemakers (in contrast to the Court) sought to limit allegedly “frivolous”
suits and curb related litigation abuses, they attempted to do so by amending other rules. See, e.g.,
Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 542 (1991) (noting that “Rule 11 is
‘aimed at curbing abuses of the judicial system’” (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 397 (1990))); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to the 1983 & 1993
amendments (noting specifically that the amendments to Rule 11 were intended to reduce frivolous
claims).
36 See Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination Cases, 57
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 777 (2012–2013) (discussing the “pro-defendant heuristics” at play in
these decisions); see also, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (affirming the grant
of defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a Title VII action). Despite the rhetoric of
“litigation explosions,” it is clear that the overwhelming majority of aggrieved individuals never
take their claims to court. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
153 (1993) (noting that “only about a tenth of filed claims ever reach a courtroom”); David M.
Engel, Perception and Decision at the Threshold of Tort Law: Explaining the Infrequency of Claims, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 334 (2013) (exploring some of the reasons why “the vast majority of injury
cases” are disposed of “before the victim takes any action” in court).
37 E.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585-86 (2009) (citing Matsushita and Scott in granting
summary judgment to plaintiffs challenging an affirmative action plan on the grounds that their
adversary lacked a “strong basis in evidence to believe that it [would] be subject to disparateimpact liability” absent taking a race-conscious action).
38 David L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The Role of Summary Judgment in the Administration
of Civil Justice, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 359, 380 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
39 See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District
Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL STUD. 861, 882-83 (2007) (finding an increase in the rate of
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been particularly effective in defeating employment discrimination, equal
pay, and civil rights claims.40
Twombly and Iqbal proved even more effective in achieving anti-plaintiff
results. First, they allow dismissal at an earlier stage, thereby freeing
defendants from the need to mount a defense or even plead. Second, they
require greater factual support and thereby place heavier burdens on
plaintiffs before they even file suit. Third, they authorize a high degree of
judicial discretion and encourage dismissals based on relatively subjective
evaluations of the pleadings. Finally, and most restrictively, they require
plaintiffs to plead facts before they have been able to obtain discovery. That
requirement is especially likely to be fatal in the countless cases in which
corporate and government defendants are in sole possession of critical
evidence. After Twombly and Iqbal, motions to dismiss increased rapidly and
succeeded more often.41 A recent study found that the two decisions
“negatively affected” at least 15.4% of employment discrimination cases,

summary judgment motions made from 12% to 19% and an increase in cases terminated by
summary judgment from 3.7% to 7.8%).
40 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse? 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 128 n.68 (2009) (citing studies on
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases); Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue,
Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short, Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the
Intersection of Employment Discrimination and Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 752
(2012–2013) (noting the frequency with which summary judgment is granted for defendants in
employment discrimination cases); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The
Overuse of Summary Judgment in Equal Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 815, 821-24 (2012–2013)
(identifying a similar phenomenon in Equal Pay Act cases); Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122
YALE L. J. ONLINE 109, 110-12 (2012) (explaining that federal courts were hostile to discrimination claims and use summary judgment to bring “prodefendant outcomes”); David L. Lee &
Jennifer C. Weiss, Inferences in Employment Law Compared to Other Areas of the Law: Turning the
Rules Upside Down, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 781, 791-96 (2012–2013) (ascribing the trend toward
summary judgment in employment cases to judges’ insistence on drawing certain inferences in
favor of the movant-employer and refusing to draw inferences in favor of the employee); Theodore
Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates Over Time, Across Case Categories, and
Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 28, 31, 33 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-022), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1138373 (higher summary judgment rates for civil rights cases).
41 JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL C TR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A C LAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE J UDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 9-11, 14 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878646;
Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46
U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 614 (2012) (finding an increase in the grant of 12(b)(6) motions with leave
to amend from 6% under Conley to 21% after Iqbal). See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring
Iqbal (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting the increased success of motions to
dismiss after Twombly and Iqbal, particularly in civil rights cases).
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18.1% of civil rights cases, and (excluding cases involving financial instruments) at least 21.5% of cases in other categories.42
Juxtaposing Celotex with Twombly and Iqbal, moreover, illustrates the
purposeful nature of the Court’s reasoning in seeking those results. In
Celotex, the Court explained that there was a close relationship between
Rules 8 and 56:
Before the shift to “notice pleading” accomplished by the Federal
Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the
principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses
could be isolated and prevented from going to trial . . . . But with
the advent of “notice pleading,” the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills
this function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion
for summary judgment.43
Celotex reasoned, in other words, that summary judgment should be easier
to obtain because “notice pleading” under Rule 8 had essentially eliminated
dismissals for failure to state a claim. However, when Twombly and Iqbal
subsequently made Rule 8 dismissals more readily available, the Court
ignored the need it had stressed in Celotex for a balanced relationship
between Rules 8 and 56.44 The Court did not suggest in either case the
consequent need, in light of the newly expanded availability of Rule 8
dismissals, to re-rebalance the Federal Rules and return the summary
judgment standard to its pre-trilogy level.
Finally, Wal-Mart and Comcast promise the same anti-plaintiff results
under Rule 23. By imposing heavy evidentiary burdens on plaintiff classes,
these cases require more substantial proof at an earlier stage and multiply
the costs required to litigate in the class form. They promise to discourage
and defeat large numbers of class actions, especially those brought by
consumers and other large classes with relatively small individual claims.45
42 Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2332 (2012). But see generally Lonny Hoffman,
Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to
Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (raising issues with the data relied on by Gelbach).
43 Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
44 In 2002, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the principle that there was a balanced relationship
between Rules 8 and 56. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002) (explaining
that “[o]ther provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule
8(a)’s simplified notice pleading standard,” including Rules 12 and 56).
45 The Court did not raise the requirements for class certification in all of its decisions. See,
e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1203-04 (2013) (holding that a
district court need not consider rebuttal evidence at the class certification stage); Erica P. John
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Although both decisions are recent, class action defendants “have flooded
courts with motions challenging discrimination and violation of labor
laws.”46 In addition, a plaintiffs’ class action law firm found that, by the end
of 2012, “Wal-Mart ha[s] been cited a total of 541 times in lower court
rulings, a remarkable figure for a decision rendered in June of 2011.”47
Further, doubling down on its effort to defeat class actions, the Roberts
Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that corporations could
deprive complainants of their right to bring class actions by imposing
mandatory arbitration clauses in form contracts.48 By compelling customers
and employees to arbitrate rather than allowing them to sue, corporations
can deprive them of their day in court and force them into less desirable
forums. Corporate defendants are often able to select arbitrators, limit
discovery, ensure secrecy, minimize potential damages, and create de facto
economic incentives for arbitration companies to favor their interests. In the
two years since Concepcion, the courts have relied on arbitration clauses to
dismiss more than a hundred consumer class actions.49
During the confirmation process, then-Judge John Roberts was asked
whether he would support “the little guy” or “the big guy.” He replied easily
that he would simply ensure that “the Constitution and laws of the United
States” determined who won.50 Unfortunately, no one asked him whether he
would try to see that “the little guy” could at least get “the big guy” into
court so that the Constitution and laws could actually be applied to his claim.

Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186-87 (2011) (holding that securities fraud
plaintiffs need not prove “loss causation” at the class certification stage). Notably, however, in
Amgen, four of the conservative Justices continued to press their effort to handicap plaintiffs and
protect corporate defendants. Justice Alito suggested the desirability of reconsidering the fraudon-the-market theory of liability in actions for securities fraud, Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1204 (Alito, J.,
concurring), and Justice Scalia, id. at 1205-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Justices Thomas and
Kennedy, id. at 1206-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting), urged a more restrictive requirement for class
certification in such actions.
46 Examination of Litigation Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil
Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 73 (2013) (statement of Joanne Doroshow,
Executive Director, Center for Justice & Democracy at New York Law School) (citation omitted).
47 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE C LASS A CTION LITIGATION REPORT
1 (2013), available at http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/CAR2013preview.pdf.
48 See generally 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). The Court reaffirmed this ruling in American Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
49 See Examination of Litigation Abuses, supra note 46, at 71-72; see also Shauhin Talesh, How the
“Haves” Come out Ahead in the Twenty-First Century, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 519, 525-26 (2013)
(emphasizing the inherent power imbalance in allowing companies to preclude class action suits
and dictate the conflict resolution process).
50 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the U.S.:
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 109th Cong. 448 (2005).
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C. Social Congruence
The third characteristic that the decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56
share is their near perfect congruence with the practical social results that
commonly flow from the decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.51
In constitutional, statutory, and common-law matters, those Courts regularly
burdened plaintiffs while protecting corporate52 and governmental53
defendants.54

51 See generally MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT : THE S TRUGGLE FOR THE
CONSTITUTION (2013); JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(2007); THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE:
INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME C OURT (2007).
52 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REV.
637, 637 (2012) (describing the Court as “captured by the Chamber of Commerce”); Lee Epstein,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1431, 1471 (2013) (highlighting the favorable treatment of businesses by the Roberts Court);
A.E. Dick Howard, Ten Things the 2012–13 Term Tells Us About the Roberts Court, 99 VA. L. REV.
48, 52-54 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court sided with the Chamber of Commerce, the
representative of big business, in fourteen of eighteen cases in which the Chamber filed amicus
briefs last year); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html (describing the Supreme Court
as “surprisingly united in cases affecting business interests”). See generally ALAN B. MORRISON,
SAVED BY THE SUPREME COURT: RESCUING CORPORATE AMERICA (2011).
53 While the Court protected governments against tort and civil rights claims, it treated
governmental units much less favorably when they sought to enforce certain kinds of regulatory,
civil rights, and pro-consumer laws or sought to implement affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Ricci
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592-93 (2009) (finding a Title VII violation by a city when it invalidated
promotional test results on the ground that test results had disparate racial impact); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 745-48 (2007) (invalidating a local
school district desegregation plan which used race as a factor in student assignments designed to
increase diversity); infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
54 This characteristic social pattern is not, of course, absolute or all-encompassing. Given
different legal areas and different factual contexts, variations occurred due to the vast number of
considerations that can affect judicial decisionmaking, as well as differences in outlook and
assumptions among the conservative Justices. The Court’s most conservative Justices, for example,
opposed the Court’s use of the Due Process Clause to limit punitive damages. See, e.g., State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429-30 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Similarly, the conservative bloc sometimes split in “tort reform” cases, e.g., Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), and in employment discrimination cases, e.g., Burlington Indust., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and on occasion upheld plaintiff claims, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). See generally MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW
AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT (2013) (distinguishing between rulings that seemed to
reflect primarily legal considerations and those that seemed to reflect ideological considerations);
Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313
(2012) (pointing out limits to the Court’s ideological decisionmaking).

2014]

From the Particular to the General

1743

Examples abound.55 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts limited securities
fraud actions,56 restricted suits against pharmaceutical companies,57 and
construed the Federal Arbitration Act broadly to exclude plaintiffs from the
courts.58 They deployed the Eleventh Amendment to bar actions against
states and state agencies under the Fair Labor Standards Act and federal
antidiscrimination laws,59 and they construed the Due Process Clause to
limit the reach of long-arm statutes designed to protect consumers.60
Perhaps most arresting, Chief Justice Rehnquist used the Federal Judicial
Conference to campaign against the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
and shortly after its enactment joined the Court’s four other conservative
Justices in striking down the private cause of action it created.61
Many of the most restrictive decisions came in civil rights cases. Indeed,
in 1989, as soon as the appointments of Justices Scalia and Kennedy created
a solid five-Justice conservative bloc, the Court issued a string of decisions62
55 See generally Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006), and compare
the qualifications, emphasizing the role of ideology in the Court’s decisionmaking, in Stephen B.
Burbank and Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014).
56 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (limiting Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) to domestic transactions); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (precluding private action for aiding and
abetting under § 10(b)); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 166-67 (2008) (similarly limiting the private right of action in Rule 10b-5 cases).
57 Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581-82 (2011) (limiting company liability by holding
that federal drug regulations preempt state law claims).
58 See generally, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express
Co., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Co., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
59 See generally, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (broadening Eleventh Amendment immunity by holding that a suit by a federal agency is not a suit by
the U.S. government); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (applying the Eleventh Amendment
bar to a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act brought in state court); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223 (1989) (applying the Eleventh Amendment bar to claims under the Education of the
Handicapped Act).
60 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790-91 (2011) (finding that the
Due Process Clause prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction based on a stream-of-commerce theory).
61 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating the civil remedy
found in 42 U.S.C. § 13981). See generally Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying,
Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000) (documenting Justice Rehnquist’s opposition to the VAWA).
62 See generally Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (construing the
phrase equal right “to make and enforce contracts” in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 narrowly to exclude from
coverage claims alleging on-the-job racial harassment); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989) (ignoring the disparate impact of a seniority system absent evidence of discriminatory
intent); Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing white firefighters to challenge employment decisions taken pursuant to consent decrees intended to increase hiring and promotion of
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that appeared so consistent in their purpose and so driven by the votes and
values of the new conservative majority that Congress felt compelled to
respond with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.63 The statute reversed parts of
several decisions, amended five separate civil rights statutes, and proclaimed
its express purpose “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes.”64
Thereafter, shifting from frontal assault to somewhat less obvious Fabian
tactics, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts continued steadily to restrict the
nation’s civil rights laws. They barred or heavily burdened claims against
local governments and government officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,65 while
expanding the immunities enjoyed by individual government officials.66
They sharply narrowed the reach of the civil rights conspiracy statute,67
heightened requirements for plaintiffs under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196468 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,69 restricted
black firefighters); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (imposing a higher
burden on plaintiffs in establishing a prima facie case for employment discrimination), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon
Co v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding
that a defendant can overcome a gender discrimination claim by showing the same decision would
have been made absent a consideration of gender). Two further cases decided in 1991 also seemed
to follow the pattern. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (finding that Title
VII does not apply extraterritorially to U.S. firms employing Americans abroad); W. Va. Univ.
Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (precluding fee shifting for expert witnesses in civil rights cases).
63 See generally Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Ward’s Cove, or All of the Above,” 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287
(1993); Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L.
REV. 1459 (1994); Peter M. Leibold, Stephen A. Sola & Reginald E. Jones, Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Race to the Finish—Civil Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993).
64 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)).
65 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748 (2005); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of
Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781 (1997);
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See generally Susan A.
Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick
v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2011) (tracing the declining utility of § 1983).
66 See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199-201 (2004) (per curiam) (extending qualified
immunity by tightening the particularized showing required to demonstrate “clearly established”
law); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (requiring that “clearly established” law be
demonstrated at a “particularized” level of generality such that a “reasonable official” would
recognize that he was violating a constitutional right).
67 See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274-287 (1993) (heightening
the requirements for stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
68 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (denying a retaliation claim by adopting a relatively stringent causation requirement); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133
S. Ct. 2434, 2448, 2454 (2013) (denying liability by defining the term “supervisor” narrowly).
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remedies under both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196470 and Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972,71 and limited the awards available
under the civil rights attorney’s fees statute.72 They nearly extinguished the
power of the federal courts to create implied causes of action based on
federal statutes73 and severely curtailed their power to create causes of
action under the Constitution itself.74 Finally, they narrowed the powers of
Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting enforcement of civil rights statutes against states and state agencies.75
69 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 179-80 (2009) (ruling that a plaintiff must
prove that age was a but-for cause of the adverse employment action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
70 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (finding no private right of action
under § 602).
71 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-93 (1998) (narrowing the
private right of action available under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
72 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 610 (2001) (ruling that the “catalyst theory” is an impermissible basis for awarding attorney’s
fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and Americans with Disability Act); Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103, 115-116 (1992) (limiting attorney’s fees when only nominal damages are awarded); W.
Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-02 (1991) (constraining the ability to collect fees
for expert witnesses).
73 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67 (2008)
(narrowing grounds for liability in claims under the implied private right of action found in SEC
Rule 10b-5); Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 (holding that Title VI does not “create a freestanding
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602”); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292
(restricting grounds of liability for claims under Title IX’s private right of action). Justice Scalia
has repeatedly insisted that the federal courts are not “common law” courts with common law
powers, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring), and
urged “the categorical position that federal private rights of action will not be implied,” Thompson
v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). He nonetheless
viewed the federal courts as sufficiently “common law” courts to allow them to create judge-made
defenses against tort suits, Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 (1988), and to invoke
common law principles to trump statutory policy and limit claims under § 1983, Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486-90 (1994); Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
74 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (denying a Fourth Amendment claim
for arrest and detention based on allegedly pretextual reasons and without probable cause); Wilkie
v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 567-68 (2007) (denying a Bivens claim in spite of allegedly repeated
abusive tactics by federal agents); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 (denying a Bivens claim against a private
corporation operating a correctional facility under a contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons);
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (denying a Bivens claim and outlining an analysis
that sharply restricted the availability of other such claims); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669, 685-86 (1987) (denying a Bivens claim against the U.S. Army even though the U.S. Army had
knowingly and intentionally deceived the plaintiff, an enlisted person, who was allegedly seriously
injured as a result).
75 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (denying a claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act brought against a state institution); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000) (dismissing a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as prohibited by the sovereign immunity of states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
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The majority’s defenders contend that those decisions flowed from
constitutional principles mandating strict limits on federal judicial power.
The problem with that defense, however, is that the Court’s use of the
judicial power has been consistent mainly in its social results but not in any
principled practice of “restraint” or deference to other levels and branches
of government. Most commonly, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts found
their judicial limitation principles applicable when asked to uphold claims of
consumers, employees, tort victims, environmentalists, and civil rights
plaintiffs. For these claims, they portrayed the judicial power as largely or
wholly impotent.76 Just as often, however, when the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts were asked to protect certain other interests, they ignored their
principles of judicial limitation and exercised their power actively and
robustly.77 They used their power to strike down numerous state and federal
enactments, insulate state and local governments from damages suits,
restrict or invalidate local affirmative action plans, limit congressional power
and deny plaintiffs standing under Article III, conjure from whole cloth
common law defenses for military contractors, and create novel constitutional rights protecting gun dealers and owners.78 Most striking, they used
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (ruling that the federal Patent
Remedy Act “cannot be sustained under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” in an action brought
against a state institution).
76 See e.g., Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 308-10 (2003) (discussing how the Rehnquist Court constricted federal
judicial remedy powers and how “the judiciary itself bec[ame] seen as a political institution”).
77 During the 1990s, “the Rehnquist Court voided actions taken by states in 54.7% of the
relevant cases it decided (111 of 203), an invalidation rate that was slightly higher than the Warren
Court’s rate of 53.6% in such cases during its sixteen years of existence (128 of 239).” Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., The Courts, Federalism, and the Federal Constitution, 1920–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920—) 127, 172
(Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins, eds., 2008).
78 See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 105-07
(2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was not as solicitous of states’ rights as often claimed
and that it actively invalidated laws passed by Congress); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Essay,
Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301, 1368-72
(2002) (arguing that the conservative Justices invalidated many state laws and followed similar, yet
nuanced, patterns of voting on issues involving state powers in criminal law, religion, and freedom
of speech cases); Howard, supra note 52, at 51, 52-54 (noting that the Roberts Court displays
certain trends, such as an affinity toward big business, a “skepticism” toward affirmative action, and
a willingness to engage in judicial activity in particularly ideological cases); Rorie Spill Solberg &
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Activism, Ideology, and Federalism: Judicial Behavior in Constitutional
Challenges Before the Rehnquist Court, 1986–2000,” 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 237, 254 (2006)
(finding that “[a]ll the justices who significantly deviate from the Court do so in the direction
predicted by their ideology”); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Behavior of Supreme Court Justices When Their
Behavior Counts the Most: An Informal Study, 97 JUDICATURE 82, 83-84 (2013) (finding that
ideological influences affect Supreme Court Justices more frequently in significant constitutional
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their judicial power audaciously in ways that promised to entrench the
Republican Party: invalidating restrictions on electoral spending, clearing
the way for widely recognized and methodical voter suppression efforts, and
installing a Republican in the White House by prematurely terminating a
presidential election.79
The decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts construing Rules 8,
23, and 56 stand prominently in the “boldness for business” half of that
jurisprudential divide. First, they exemplify the willingness of the conservative Justices to use the judicial power aggressively, for those decisions
essentially rewrote rules that Congress had authoritatively adopted and that
the Court itself had previously construed differently. Second, they exemplify
the conservative Justices’ typical assertion of activist and robust judicial
power when the result is to constrain or defeat tort, employee, consumer,
antitrust, environmental, and civil rights plaintiffs.
III. “THE WHOLE OF THINGS”
The three common characteristics of the Court’s decisions construing
Rules 8, 23, and 56—their break from established interpretations, their
tendency to bring similar social results, and the congruence of those results
with the characteristic social results of the Court’s decisions in other areas—
suggest that a common inspiration links those Federal Rules decisions not
only with one another but also with much of the jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.
That common inspiration cannot simply be the perceived desirability of
reducing litigation costs, limiting the federal caseload, or addressing the
genuine difficulties that class actions present.80 While those considerations

cases relating to issues such as voter enfranchisement, gun control, and abortion, than in other
cases). See generally KECK, supra note 51.
79 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, No. 12-536, slip op. at 39-40 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2014)
(invalidating a federal statute that imposed aggregate limits on campaign contributions); Shelby
Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649-50 (2013) (invalidating § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act,
which dictated the formula for the preclearance requirement, on the basis that the requirement
was no longer necessary in today’s social environment); Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 368-72 (2010) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute that restricted corporate
spending in political elections); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109-11 (2000) (invalidating the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision to hold manual recounts of the state’s votes in the 2000 presidential election).
80 See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Essay, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010) (discussing the Court’s restrictive approach to procedural issues, which
frustrates many claimants’ attempts to have their cases tried on the merits). For more information
on some of the special complications of class actions, see Richard Marcus, Still Confronting the
Consolidation Conundrum, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 557 (2012).
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are relevant, they are inadequate to explain the Court’s decisions. First, any
effort to change rules controlling access to the federal courts necessarily
involves an assessment of social consequences, including which types of
claims and litigants will be advantaged and which will be disadvantaged.81
Thus, the general goal of limiting the federal caseload, however warmly
embraced, can never be adequate to determine which specific limitations
should be adopted. That determination requires some additional criterion or
a more specific goal. Second, while every member of the Court is sensitive
to docket pressures and has supported measures designed to limit the
federal caseload,82 the Justices have regularly disagreed as to many specific
measures. The decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts construing
Rules 8, 23, and 56—and most of their other anti-plaintiff decisions—have,
in fact, been largely and often exclusively the product of the Court’s
conservative majority. Thus, the conservative majority is responsible for
selecting the particular kinds of limitations the Court has imposed, and the
choice of those particular limitations cannot be explained by a general policy
of limiting the federal caseload.
Indeed, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., the conservative
Justices cast a bright and revealing light on their views about how much
weight should be given to the goal of docket limitation.83 In that case, they
gave an expansive interpretation to the supplementary jurisdiction statute84—
whose provisions could readily and fairly have been construed far more
narrowly—and thereby stretched federal jurisdiction more widely over state
law issues and opened the federal courts to large numbers of complex state

81 See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008).
82 See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068-69 (2013) (unanimous) (holding that certain actions involving patents could be brought in state court and were not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-45 (2009) (unanimous)
(allowing lower courts to dismiss civil rights claims against government officials on qualified
immunity grounds without ruling on the merits of the claims); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555
U.S. 335, 348-49 (2009) (unanimous) (holding that heads of prosecutors’ offices could be held
liable only for failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claims on exceptionally narrow grounds);
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007) (unanimous)
(holding that a district court is not required to establish its own jurisdiction before it dismisses a
lawsuit for forum non conveniens); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308, 319-20 (2005) (unanimous) (tightening the requirements for a state-law claim involving
federal law issues to come within federal question jurisdiction). See generally JOHN ROBERTS, 2012
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2012year-endreport.pdf (showing smaller Supreme Court dockets in recent years).
83 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
84 For the text of the supplementary jurisdiction statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
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law cases.85 The decision not only conflicted with the goal of docket limitation but also contradicted the conservatives’ frequently proclaimed principles that purportedly demanded limitations on federal jurisdiction and
greater respect for state courts and state sovereignty. Although puzzling in
terms of doctrine and inconsistent in terms of their avowed principles, the
conservatives’ action was fully consistent with their substantive social
policies. The interpretation they adopted promised to defeat class actions by
allowing defendants to remove them to the relatively unfavorable national
courts. Thus, Allapattah—by expanding rather than contracting federal
jurisdiction in this particular context—served the same substantive social
policy goals that inspired the Court’s anti-plaintiff decisions in Wal-Mart,
Comcast, and Concepcion.86
A. Market Ideology
Since the 1970s market ideologies have grown increasingly prominent
among American conservatives and within the ranks of the Republican
Party.87 Those ideologies are powerful because they meld a number of
85
86

Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 571-72.
Allapattah made a jurisdictional change that achieved what congressional Republicans and
business interests had been urging for a decade and one that they finally succeeded in enacting
into law the very same year. Like Allapattah, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub.
L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions raising state law
claims and thereby promised to draw more of them into the federal courts, which had become
increasingly hostile to class actions since the mid-1990s. Revealingly, Republican male judges in
the lower federal courts subsequently applied CAFA with particular vigor to restrict class actions.
For a review of a study reflecting these results, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1585-86 (2008).
87 See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, A GENDA FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991) (Bush administration) (suggesting restrictive reforms to
the civil litigation system in order to limit costs and burdens); AM. TORT REFORM FOUND.,
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2007), available at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/
2010/12/jh2007.pdf (criticizing excessive tort liability and highlighting jurisdictions that allegedly
hand out excessive plaintiff awards in personal injury suits); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF
THE TORT POLICY WORKING G ROUP ON THE C AUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE C URRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE A VAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986)
(Reagan administration) (suggesting limitations on tort liability to address an alleged liability
insurance crisis); Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman,
Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), available at http://law.wlu.edu/
deptimages/Powell%20archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf (explaining dangerous threats
that tort liability posed to the free market economy in the United States). For general treatments
of the prominence of market ideologies in the conservative legal movement, see DONALD T.
CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE
POLITICAL HISTORY (2007) and STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE
LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008).
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diverse but often interrelated social values and assumptions that justify a
range of partisan policies under the banner of a heralded “common good.”88
They scorn and often wholly reject government economic regulation, and
they encourage a true believer’s faith in the operation of a near-perfect “free
market” and the social benevolence of supposedly “rational” market
behavior.89 These ideologies preach that efforts to impose burdens and
liabilities on business are inefficient and that litigation against business
wastes resources, destroys jobs, stalls the economy, and raises consumer
prices. Implicit, and sometimes explicit, are the familiar counterposed
assumptions of the worthy and unworthy: individuals who are able, honest,
moral, and hard-working against those who are lazy, foolish, undisciplined,
or immoral. Market ideologies assume that the former earn their livelihoods
by hard work while pursuing the world’s fair and ample opportunities for
economic success; they assume that the latter seek to live off the work of
others, exploit overly generous social welfare programs, and pursue “frivolous” lawsuits in the meretricious search for free riches. Among the most
designing advocates of those market ideologies are the forces behind the
“tort reform” movement, which is a well-financed and well-organized
campaign to protect business interests by restricting judicial remedies,
imposing heavy burdens on claimants, and limiting or denying access to the
courts.90 Ultimately, those market ideologies lend themselves to justifying
88 For a general overview of how market ideologies can mix social values to validate partisan
policies, see JOSEPH CRESPINO, IN SEARCH OF ANOTHER COUNTRY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE
CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION (2007); JOSEPH CRESPINO, STROM THURMOND’S
AMERICA (2012); GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, RULE AND RUIN: THE DOWNFALL OF MODERATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY: FROM EISENHOWER TO THE TEA
PARTY (2012); ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960S (2012); ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003).
89 It is essential to distinguish contemporary “market ideologies”—sweeping, uncompromising,
and intensely partisan—from professional economic analyses of markets, which are careful,
nuanced, qualified, and often highly skeptical of market behavior. See generally ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, T HE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977) (explaining the rise of capitalism and exploring
biases and inconsistencies in “market” reasoning); J OSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (examining the imperfections in the “market forces” behind globalization and suggesting appropriate reforms); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY
(2012) (arguing that income in the United States does not accurately track productive contribution
to society and explaining the inefficiencies in market institutions).
90 See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL M CCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 35-38 (2004) (explaining tort reform background and the
history behind the tort reform movement); Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 971-76
(2009) (illustrating the misleading nature and “flawed methodology” of the U.S. Chamber of
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economic exploitation, social inequality, and systemic disregard for the poor,
weak, powerless, disadvantaged, and disorganized.91 Indeed, exhibiting
wondrous flexibility, such market ideologies can be adroitly contoured to
justify almost anything that serves the interests of powerful economic groups.
Those market ideologies and “tort reform” goals call for exactly the kind
of rulings that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have typically supplied.
They are consistent with their decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56, as
well as their decisions addressing many constitutional, statutory, and
common law issues. Those ideologies and goals seem a common inspiration
that helped shape the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
and produced the cornucopia of anti-plaintiff decisions that flooded the
doctrinal landscape.92

Commerce’s Survey of State Liability and tort reform claims); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as
a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV.
423, 498-510 (1994) (describing the use of forum-selection clauses as a “tort reform” tool to
handicap consumers); Purcell, supra note 81, at 1889-1912 (describing the “Modern ‘Tort Reform’
Movement”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Pugnacious Builder of the Business Lobby, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2013, at BU 1 (describing how the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s “free market
views” guide the chamber and shape its lobbying).
91 The market ideologies of the conservative Justices bring social consequences that parallel
the social consequences promised by their recent major decisions on both voting rights and
campaign finance. See supra note 79 (McCutcheon, Shelby County, and Citizens United). These
decisions handicap ordinary Americans, especially the weakest and most vulnerable: they
encourage in varying ways the further concentration of money and power in the hands of the
nation’s largest corporations and wealthiest citizens. On the growing inequality in the United
States, see LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE P OLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE NEW GILDED AGE 288-89 (2008) (noting the strong influence of the “ideological convictions of elected officials” on public policy). See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK
SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM (2008); J ACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED I TS BACK ON THE MIDDLE
CLASS (2010). For the disproportionate political influence of wealth and its success in securing
favorable public policies, see generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE:
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND P OLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); Benjamin I. Page,
Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11
PERSP. ON POL. 51, 66 (2013) (noting the findings of a study that found that wealthy Americans
are more likely to be politically conservative).
92 See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. P OSNER, THE BEHAVIOR
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL C HOICE
385 (2013) (“[I]deology influences judicial decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary.”).
Although the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts is the product of varied factors
and encompasses different shifts and emphases, ideology has been a critical driving force in
shaping its social imperatives and doctrinal interpretations. See, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra
note 55, at 1569 (noting that research on these courts “assumes that the phenomenon in question is
a manifestation of the ideological preference of an increasingly conservative Supreme Court”);
Stone, supra note 78, at 89 (noting that the decisions of conservative Justices Rehnquist, Roberts,
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The majority of the Justices on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are
conservative Republicans who share, with varying shadings, their party’s
ideological views and values.93 Indeed, prior to ascending to the high bench,
five of the Justices held high-level positions in Republican administrations.94 Moreover, all were selected by Republican presidents and supported
virtually unanimously by Republican senators seeking assiduously to create
a Court that would reflect their party’s views.95 With respect to the values
of market ideologies and the goals of “tort reform,” they largely succeeded.96
and others “were determined first and foremost by their own policy preferences”); Stephen N.
Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014).
93 “A judge who is a ‘strict constructionist’ in constitutional matters[,]” Rehnquist wrote
when advising the Nixon administration on Supreme Court nominations, “will generally not be
favorably inclined toward claims of either criminal defendants or civil rights plaintiffs.” JOHN W.
DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT
THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 16 (2001). John Dean, Nixon’s White House counsel,
confirmed that Rehnquist’s statement was “a very accurate description of what Nixon wanted” in
his Court appointees. Id. In Crawford-El v. Britton, two of the Court’s most ideologically driven
conservatives rejected the legitimacy of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), a foundation of
modern civil rights enforcement actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
94 See Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some Republican
Supreme Court Justices ‘Evolve’ and Others Don’t?, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 457, 460-61 (2007)
(recounting the political backgrounds of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito).
95 E.g., TOOBIN, supra note 51, at 338; TUSHNET, supra note 54, at 47-48; see also HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 48 (rev. ed. 1999) (“It is an
unwritten law of the judicial nominating process that the president will not normally select an
individual from the ranks of the political opposition.”); LEE E PSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL,
ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 120 (2005) (explaining
the assumption that “presidents can influence the direction of legal policy . . . by placing
politically like-minded individuals on the bench”); NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS:
POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS
116-21 (2005) (explaining how interest groups and political activists mobilize to influence
nominations); JAMES F. SIMON, I N HIS OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD
NIXON’S AMERICA (1973); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Increasing
Importance of Ideology in the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L.
REV. 609, 611 (2008) (noting that “Presidents typically focus on candidates most likely to advance
their own political goals”); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Nancy Staudt & Rene Lindstadt, The
Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1145, 1149-53 (2005) (explaining how the confirmation process for Supreme Court justices
has become increasingly politicized).
96 On Republican “law reform” policy, see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text, and
compare the Court’s Rule 8 decisions with the Republican-sponsored Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.) (both similarly imposing heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs).
Subsequently, in an apparent compromise opinion, six Justices construed the statute’s heightened
pleading requirement to mean that in actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012), plaintiffs must plead facts supporting an inference of scienter “at
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Few recent events capture the ideological overlap between the shared
social imperatives of the conservative Justices and the market ideologies of
the Republican Party better than the Lilly Ledbetter case. In a paradigmatic
gender-based employment discrimination suit in 2007, the five-Justice
conservative bloc ruled that the short 180-day statute of limitations applicable
in equal pay suits began running on the date the employer made its initial
discriminatory decision. The ruling not only denied Ledbetter’s claim but
also promised to bar the overwhelming majority of all such future suits.97
Two years later, after the 2008 election gave Democrats the presidency and
large majorities in both houses of Congress, they enacted the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act: this act extended the statute of limitations in equal pay cases
by providing that the clock begins running anew with each paycheck that
reflects an employer’s discriminatory decision.98 The congressional vote on
the act tracked party lines almost perfectly. With near unanimity, Republicans in both the House and the Senate backed the ruling of the Court’s
conservative majority by opposing the measure.99
Similarly, few cases illustrate the determination of the conservative Justices to impose their anti-plaintiff policy goals better than the recent
decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.100 There, the
five-Justice bloc upheld a contractual provision that prohibited customers
from bringing an antitrust class action and compelled them not only to
arbitrate their claims but to do so individually.101 The customers argued that,
for individual claimants, the cost of pursuing an antitrust claim would be
prohibitive and that, as a practical matter, their claims could not proceed
unless they could be brought in a class form.102 Rejecting a fundamental

least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). Justices Scalia and Alito concurred in the
judgment and urged a more demanding standard. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329, 331, 333-34 (Scalia, J.,
and Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens dissented, suggesting a less restrictive
approach. Id. at 335-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628 (2007).
98 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (amending
scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (“[A] discriminatory compensation decision . . . occurs
each time compensation is paid . . . .”).
99 The vote in the House was 250–177, with only five Democrats voting against the Act and
only three Republicans voting in favor. 155 CONG REC. 1671 (2009). In the Senate, the vote was
sixty-one to thirty-six, with every Democrat in attendance and two Independents voting in favor;
only four Republicans—the party’s only four female Senators—supported the measure. 155 CONG.
REC. 1400 (2009).
100 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
101 Id. at 2312.
102 Id. at 2308.
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purpose of Rule 23 and transforming the concepts of legal rights and
remedies into meaningless abstractions, the five-Justice conservative bloc
dismissed the argument as irrelevant.103 The fact that an individual claim “is
not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy” they explained, “does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that
remedy.”104 Thus, the majority sanctioned a contractual weapon that
effectively barred from any possible forum an untold number of potentially
meritorious federal statutory claims.
On a more general level, both Matsushita and Twombly illustrate the conservative majority’s faith in the benevolence of the “free market” and
“rational” market behavior. Both denied any “plausible” reason to think that
corporate defendants could have acted in an anticompetitive manner. Both
103 Id. at 2309. The majority went so far as to declare that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
itself “trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.” Id. at 2312 n.5. The
act, it continued, “favor[s] the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a class-action
waiver, since ‘its principal purpose’ is the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their
terms.” Id.
104 Id. at 2311. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013),
presents a revealing contrast. There, Justice Scalia dissented and urged stricter certification
requirements in securities fraud class actions: “Certification of the class,” he argued, “is often, if
not usually, the prelude to a substantial settlement by the defendant because the costs and risks of
litigating further are so high.” Id. at 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Noticeably, sympathizing with the
defendant’s plight in Amgen, he did not apply the pivotal reasoning he employed in Italian Colors
to disregard the plaintiffs’ plight: that, however burdensome they might be, the “costs and risks of
litigating further” did not “constitute the elimination of the right to pursue” the legal options that
were formally available.
There seems to be a difference, too, between the relative lack of concern for the fate of members of the proposed plaintiff class in Italian Colors and the noticeably greater concern shown for
them in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558-59 (2011), where solicitude served to
support a restrictive interpretation of the monetary remedies available in class actions under Rule 23(b)(2).
The unfavorable treatment that the conservative Justices give to class action plaintiffs revealed
itself similarly in the contrasting interpretations they gave to the relevant federal statutes in
Concepcion and Italian Colors. In the former, they reasoned that the FAA should not be construed
to allow state law to bar enforcement of some, though not all, arbitration agreements because such
a construction would defeat the purpose of the arbitration statute. AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752-53 (2011) (holding that a state may not require procedures
inconsistent with the FAA). In contrast, in Italian Colors they reasoned that the federal antitrust
laws should be construed to allow arbitration agreements to bar many, though not all, antitrust
actions even though that construction would defeat the purpose of the antitrust laws. 133 S. Ct. at
2310-12. They justified their sweeping construction of the FAA by declaring that “the act cannot be
held to destroy itself.” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (citations omitted). They justified their
shrunken construction of the antitrust laws by declaring that “[n]o legislation pursues its purposes
at all costs.” Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522,
525-26 (1987) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The two statements constituted
not “principles” for judicial reasoning but rationales for predetermined results. Had the Justices
wished opposite results in the two cases, they could easily have switched the two statements from
one opinion to the other.
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also made what was tantamount to judicial findings of fact based solely on
the assumption that free market actors would not behave in an economically
“irrational”—and therefore unlawful—manner.105 Consequently, both insisted
that only very specific facts evidencing such behavior could possibly make
contrary allegations the least bit credible.
Easing the path to summary judgment, Matsushita found an “absence of
a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory pricing” because
defendants were “presumably rational businesses.”106 Easing the corporate
path to dismissal, Twombly announced that the “natural explanation” for
defendants’ behavior was simply “routine market conduct” and “the natural,
unilateral reaction of each [defendant] intent on keeping its regional
dominance.”107
The influence of market ideologies on the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts is especially striking when those assertions in Matsushita and
Twombly are compared with the views of an earlier Court. “[S]ummary
procedures,” a different set of Justices declared in 1962, “should be used
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles, [and] the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators . . . .”108
Twombly’s embrace of market ideology, moreover, proved particularly
revealing when it drew on what “history teaches.”109 Not surprisingly, it
selected a historical lesson that confirmed its ideological assumptions while
at the same time ignoring historical lessons that challenged those assumptions.110 Most obviously, it ignored the lesson made clear only a year after
the ruling in Matsushita, when a massive stock market crash exposed pervasive fraud and chicanery in the savings and loan industry. Indeed, another
massive economic collapse followed Twombly itself, this one exposing
pervasive fraud and chicanery in the banking, real estate, and financial
105 See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
106 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595; see also Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Business Power (explaining the relationship between the Court’s recent antitrust jurisprudence and the Chicago school
philosophy, which “opposes microeconomic intervention by the government” and “presumes that
markets nearly always work to keep business responsive to consumers and that government
intervention (including antitrust action) nearly always obstructs markets”), in THE REHNQUIST
COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 213, 214-15 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002).
107 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566, 568.
108 Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
109 550 U.S. at 567.
110 For background on one such important lesson, the Enron scandal, see generally BETHANY MCL EAN & P ETER E LKIND, T HE SMARTEST G UYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE
AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
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services industries. That crash taught such an undeniable lesson that it
drove another market ideologue, Alan Greenspan, into “a state of shocked
disbelief ” and forced him to acknowledge that his market thinking contained
a fundamental “flaw.”111 Large corporations and other supposedly rational
economic actors could behave collusively, irrationally, and unlawfully, Greenspan reluctantly admitted, and they could do so on the broadest scale
imaginable.112 The conservative Justices, however, have not acknowledged
that flaw or modified their jurisprudence to reflect that vivid historical lesson.
The commitment of the conservative Justices to market ideologies is so
ingrained that it revealed itself just as strongly in cases far removed from
issues of economic regulation. In Town of Newton v. Rumery, for example,
the conservative Justices upheld a plaintiff ’s agreement to waive his right to
sue under § 1983 in exchange for a prosecutor’s promise not to pursue a
criminal action.113 They reasoned that the agreement was voluntary, benefitted
both parties, and “would not adversely affect the relevant public interests.”114
Choosing to decide the case by applying “traditional common-law principles” of contract,115 they ruled that such agreements were enforceable
because they were “highly rational” and not “inherently coercive.”116
Four dissenters highlighted the decisive influence of the majority’s market
ideology.117 The mere fact that an agreement was “voluntary” and “highly
rational,” they stressed, was hardly sufficient to show that it should be
enforced.118 “Otherwise, a promise to pay a state trooper $20 for not issuing
a ticket for a traffic violation, or a promise to contribute to the police
department’s retirement fund in exchange for the dismissal of a felony

111 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
& Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 12, 46 (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board).
112 Id. at 45-47; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1 (describing Greenspan’s testimony regarding his
actions and the need to restrict credit default swaps to control financial markets).
113 480 U.S. 386, 397-98 (1987). Justice Powell authored the majority opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. Id. at 388. Justice O’Connor joined all but one
part of Justice Powell’s opinion, concurring separately to urge a more demanding standard for
upholding such waiver agreements. Id. at 399, 402-03 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 398 (majority opinion).
115 Id. at 392.
116 Id. at 393-94, 398.
117 To demonstrate the influence of market ideology, the dissenters pointed to a variety of
facts that should have made the agreement unenforceable but that were ignored by the majority.
Id. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 408.
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charge, would be enforceable.”119 More importantly, they insisted that the
“federal policies” underlying § 1983 should be given weight,120 noting that
the majority placed “the interest in avoiding the expense and inconvenience
of defending unmeritorious claims” above the statute’s “interest in vindication of constitutional violations.”121 Finally, they pointed to the majority’s
“unstated premise” that § 1983 suits imposed “a net burden on society.”122
Given the purpose and mandate of the statute, a calculation and evaluation
of its “net” social results was hardly a matter for judicial judgment.123
Indeed, as the dissenters emphasized, such a calculation could be made only
by ignoring “the congressional decision to attach greater importance to the
benefits associated with access to a federal remedy than to the burdens of
defending these cases.”124
Discounting statutory policies and subordinating public interests to private
ones, Rumery exemplifies the Court’s ideologically driven decisionmaking. To
reach the result the conservative Justices favored, they arbitrarily chose to
rely on “traditional common-law principles”125 instead of on the statute’s
substantive policy.126 That choice represented a free and unforced selection
of a legal standard that promised one result over a different legal standard
that supported the contrary result.127 Thus, market ideology and its anticipated social consequences ultimately directed the Court’s choice of premises
and guided the majority’s reasoning and decisionmaking. For the conservative Justices, § 1983 had no significance—legal, moral, social, political, or
constitutional—other than as a possible bargaining chip in what they coldly
viewed as a civil rights marketplace.

119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 419.
Id.
See POSNER, supra note 28, at 4 (“[I]t is even harder to estimate the benefits of our legal
system than its costs. Legal rights are options that may have value even if never exercised, but how
to value such options? And legal duties deter harmful conduct—but how effectively is extremely
difficult to determine too.”).
124 Rumery, 480 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 392 (majority opinion).
126 The conservative Justices similarly employed common law concepts to limit § 1983 in
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
127 The conservative Justices made a similar choice between principles in Shelby County v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), to invalidate a key provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
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B. Textualism, Originalism, and Traditionalism
The common characteristics of the Court’s Federal Rules decisions and
the pervasive influence of market and “tort reform” ideologies suggest
troubling conclusions about the three judicial methodologies that the
conservative Justices frequently invoke: textualism, originalism, and traditionalism. Although those methodologies are standard tools of judicial
decisionmaking, they are frequently inadequate for any number of reasons,
including their generous capacity for supporting widely varied or wholly
contradictory conclusions.128 Indeed, all three concepts have been defined in
differing ways to authorize widely divergent and even discordant criteria.129
The conservative Justices, moreover, have used all three methodologies in
dubious and inconsistent ways. As textualists, they have interpreted language
in shifting and arbitrary ways;130 as originalists, they have cherry-picked
128 For example, four of the conservative Justices supported the Defense of Marriage Act by
invoking the “traditional” nature of marriage, while one of them (Justice Kennedy) voted to void
the act by invoking the “traditional” power of the states to define marriage. United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (Kennedy, J.); id. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at
2707-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting).
129 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 129-37 (2011) (arguing that originalism and “living constitutionalism” are complementary methodologies); PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1991) (explaining that differing “constitutional
modalities” are influenced by ideology); WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291-302 (2010) (noting the
differing results reached by application of the same doctrines of legal interpretation to different
areas of the law). See generally Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1185 (discussing “new originalism” and how it differs from the originalism of the 1980s); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation
and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (recognizing that the differing
originalist methodologies do not have one comprehensive set of criteria). On some of the
permutations of rhetorical originalism, see Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism,
99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011).
130 See e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the ‘Scalia Effect’, 29 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 168-69 (2008)
(noting, for example, that Justice Scalia has condemned the use of legislative history in opinions
authored by liberal Justices but not in opinions authored by conservative Justices); Frank B. Cross,
Essay, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 2001
(2007) (arguing that textualism does not show an “effect on Court consensus” in the decisionmaking process); Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1095, 1101-20 (1993) (chronicling the Supreme Court’s reliance on statutory interpretation
and pointing out that a “variety of ideological and philosophical concerns have at times driven the
Court to ‘find’ plain meaning in statutory language which everyone else could see full well was
unclear”); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1940 (2008)
(illustrating and offering possible explanations for the conservative Justices’ “selective application
of textualist methodology to jurisdictional statutes”). “[T]he Court is more responsive to current
congressional preferences than to the preferences of the enacting Congress in statutory interpretation
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sources and avoided serious historical analysis;131 and as traditionalists, they
have arbitrarily conferred normative status on some practices while simply
disregarding others.132
In limiting class actions, for example, the conservative Justices invoked
the “historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.”133
They interpreted “tradition” to mean that individual plaintiffs had the right
to control their own independent actions and consequently that “tradition”
argued against certifying class actions. The conservative Justices, however,
ignored the fact that this same “tradition” also readily supported the
contrary purpose of expanding the use of class actions. Indeed, one of the
“original” purposes of the 1966 amendments was to assist individuals with
economically nonviable individual claims by enabling them to join together

cases.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 397 (1991).
131 E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that an individual has a
constitutional right to firearm possession despite many ambiguities in the historical record and
substantial evidence to the contrary); TUSHNET, supra note 54, at 148-86 (discussing the public’s
conception of the Second Amendment and the Court’s jurisprudence on gun control); Reva Siegel,
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008)
(arguing that the Court interpreted the Second Amendment “in accordance with the convictions
of the twentieth-century gun-rights movement”); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The
Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32 (“The Court evaded the
issue [of the original purpose of the Second Amendment] in Heller by cutting loose the Second
Amendment from any concern with state militias . . . .”). Justice Alito, who regards himself as an
originalist, admitted that originalism often “doesn’t really decide the case.” JOAN BISKUPIC,
AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA 352 (2009); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE P URPOSE OF THE PAST:
REFLECTIONS ON THE USES OF HISTORY 10-13 (2008) (arguing that “the present should not
be the criterion for what we find in the past”).
132 E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 92, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court cannot strike down on First Amendment grounds a statute that has “the
endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the
beginning of the Republic”); BISKUPIC, supra note 131, at 269-70 (noting that in some cases Justice
Scalia argued that more than an interest in social policy was necessary to justify federal action
while finding “public morality” sufficient to justify federal action in others); RICHARD A.
BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 222, 327 (1997)
(describing Justice Scalia’s use of “tradition” to oppose liberal social policies); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 97-109 (1991) (noting
Justice Scalia’s reliance on “historical tradition” and arguing that such traditions are subject to
manipulation). For the Court’s use of “tradition” in one area of law, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of
Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923 (2006), and for the
Court’s view on “invented traditions,” see Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in
THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1-14 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds., 1983).
133 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quoting Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S.
755, 762 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to assert an economically viable class claim.134 Thus, in such situations class
actions are essential to preserve that very “historic tradition” and ensure
that everyone may secure “his own day in court.”
Equally obvious, the conservative Justices ignored that very same “historic tradition” by consistently enforcing arbitration clauses in form contracts. Those decisions denied millions of individuals the possibility of
pursuing their “own day in court.”135 Indeed, in their arbitration decisions,
the conservative Justices accomplished a hat trick of methodological treason.
They not only ignored the “historic tradition,” but they also abandoned the
text of the Federal Arbitration Act and rejected its “original” meaning as well.136
Thus, the conservative Justices adapted their judicial methodologies to
serve their ideological purposes. That practice strengthens the inference
that those same ideological purposes inspired their decisions on the three
Federal Rules—decisions that were, after all, unsupported by text, original
meaning, judicial precedent, or “historic tradition.” Those considerations
point to an even broader conclusion: in construing many other federal legal
sources, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts also likely pursued those same
ideological goals. The broader significance of the Court’s decisions construing Rules 8, 23, and 56, therefore, is that they suggest that those same
ideological goals—not the conservatives’ announced legal methodologies—
shaped much or most of their jurisprudence.

134 Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“While the text of Rule 23(b)(3)
does not exclude from certification cases in which individual damages run high, the Advisory
Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’”); FED. R. CIV. P.
23 advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendments; accord Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (“The entire reconstruction of the Rule bespoke
an intention to promote more vigorously than before the dual missions of the class-action
device.”); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2147 (2000)
(explaining that “Rule 23(b)(3) was specifically designed to correct a market impediment to access
and rights enforcement for certain kinds of small claims” and, as a result, “claims that never would
have been pursued outside the group became viable”).
135 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
136 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 148 (1992) (arguing that the Court’s decisions between 1967
and 1991 “constitute a transformation of the USAA [United States Arbitration Act] worthy of the
best of medieval alchemists”); see also Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the
Supreme Court created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
99, 142 (2006) (chronicling the genesis of the FAA and the interpretive leaps that the Court has
taken to reach the various outcomes it seeks); Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV.
78, 113-18 (2011) (discussing the reach of the FAA).
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There is no principled reason why the proper construction of those three
Federal Rules would bring the same practical social results as those brought
by the proper construction of other federal law provisions. Yet the fact
remains that the conservative Justices frequently construed a range of quite
different legal sources to achieve those same congruent social results. How
can this pattern of judicial decisionmaking be explained?
One possibility is that the textualist, originalist, and traditionalist methodologies of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts revealed that all authoritative
sources of federal law embodied the same practical policies. That possibility,
however, defies credibility. The Constitution and the widely varied provisions of the U.S. Code were adopted and subsequently amended many
times over the course of two and a quarter centuries. Those adoptions and
amendments were made by diverse majorities seeking to address diverse
challenges arising from the ever-changing needs of an ever-changing society.
They could hardly all embody the same policies.
Indeed, it is apparent that many of those legal sources establish and seek
to effectuate policies quite different from, and in conflict with, those the
Court infused into its Federal Rules decisions. If textualism, originalism,
and traditionalism led the conservative Justices to find that many varied
federal law provisions reflected the same policies, that result would immediately
reveal their methodologies as inherently flawed, easily manipulable, and
ideologically inspired.
An alternate possibility is that those textualist, originalist, and traditionalist
methodologies demonstrated that the policies found in some narrow subset
of constitutional and statutory provisions were consistent with market
ideologies and that the conservative Justices chose to interpret the three
Federal Rules and other federal legal sources to conform to the policies of
that particular subset. If so, however, that would mean that in construing
the three Federal Rules and those other federal legal sources the conservative Justices were not guided by the methodologies they purported to
employ but were, instead, guided by the policies they found in that select
and narrow subset of otherwise unrelated federal law sources. If true, that
would again mean that their selection of policies was directed not by their
proclaimed methodologies but by personal preferences consistent with their
market ideologies.
All things considered, then, the most plausible explanation for the parallel
social results that mark so many of the decisions of the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts in so many areas of law is the common inspiration of market
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ideologies.137 Two conclusions seem unavoidable. One is that the proclaimed
textualist, originalist, and traditionalist methodologies of the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts frequently had little or no influence on their actual decisionmaking.138 The other is that the proclaimed faith of the conservative
Justices in those methodologies blinded them to the inadequacies of all
three methods and thereby obscured the extent to which those inadequacies
allowed their personal views to color wide swaths of federal law.
C. Judicial Ironies and “Living” Law
Finally, the decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts construing
Rules 8, 23, and 56 point to a series of revealing ironies. The first, and most
obvious, is that the ostensible goal of limiting the federal caseload—even if
it were accepted as an adequate explanation for the Justices’ decisions—
reveals that the Court was acting pragmatically in response to practical
pressures. That, in turn, would illustrate the “living” nature of law and
137 The conservative Justices did not, of course, consciously and purposely adopt “party”
policies. Rather, they examined issues through the ideological preconceptions and assumptions
shared with most of their fellow Republicans. Those principles are so deeply embedded that their
influence may have remained largely undetected while their promptings seemed nothing but
“natural” and logical premises and conclusions. What has been called “motivated reasoning” shapes
judicial decisionmaking, but it does so in varying degrees with its strongest influence on relatively
open and contested issues. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial
Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 44352 (2012) (discussing the impact of societal influence and “motivated reasoning” on constitutional
decisionmaking).
138 Indeed, their ideological imperatives seemed to determine their thinking even on relatively
technical issues of actual market theory. In 1988, the Court adopted one aspect of market theory—
the “efficient market” hypothesis—to make it easier for plaintiffs to assert securities fraud claims.
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-50 (1988). In Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1203-04 (2013), where the Court refused to raise the requirements for
certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, four of the conservatives wrote separately to urge reconsideration of the merits and use of that theory. Alito suggested that the “efficient markets” theory
may rest on a “faulty economic premise,” id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring); Scalia declared the
Court’s use of the theory “regrettable” and responsible for “unquestionably disastrous” consequences, id.at 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting); and Thomas (joined by Kennedy and, in relevant part,
by Scalia) declared that the Basic Court’s use of the efficient market theory was “questionable” and
suggested that it be reconsidered, id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Market theories that
aided plaintiffs, in other words, should be discarded.
Similarly, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), where the conservative
Justices ruled that consumer adhesion contracts requiring waiver of the right to use class action
forms were enforceable as written, they casually dispensed with the fact that there had been no
meaningful “market” bargaining: they noted simply that “the times in which consumer contracts
were anything other than adhesive are long past.” Id. at 1750. When the assumption of “rational”
economic bargaining that undergirds market theory could be used to aid plaintiffs, it too should be
discarded.
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demonstrate that textualism, originalism, and traditionalism often provide
inadequate, irrelevant, and easily dismissible guides.
A second irony is that originalism and traditionalism fit awkwardly with
the unrestrained corporate behavior that the market ideologies of the
conservative majority encourage. Free market capitalism spawns a social and
economic dynamic that challenges established practices and brings constant
and often highly disruptive social changes. Over the centuries it has
transformed and continues to transform the world, discarding or reshaping
inherited behavior patterns while spurring new and diverse practices in
their place. The result is a relentless process of remolding and recreating
traditions and a steady withering of the ability of each succeeding generation to accurately understand whatever “original meanings” might actually
have existed and might otherwise have been discernible and applicable. That
process disrupts and recreates “traditions,” and it renders any such original
meanings increasingly less knowable, reliable, and specific. Thus, it makes
contemporary claims about the purported existence and legal significance of
proposed “traditions” and “original” meanings increasingly dubious and
unpersuasive.
A third irony is that those dynamic social processes illustrate the classic,
if paradoxical, function of “originalist” reasoning.139 Normative appeals to
ancient ideals, venerable texts, or vanished “golden ages” are designed to
indict the values and practices of the present, and they are consequently
anything but “conservative.” They are, in fact, disruptive and even radical.
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, originalism functions in practice not as a
guide for an actual return to some earlier and truer legal regime—a practical
impossibility in most, if not all, cases—but as a technique to undermine the
status quo and install some novel regime.140
The final irony is that contemporary ideological originalism turns out to
be an effective, if covert, method of developing a “living” law and “living”
constitutionalism. In spite of the sharp contrast in contemporary debates
between advocates of “originalism” and “living constitutionalism,”141 both
139 Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 121-22
(showing that appeals to “history” are a method of justifying constitutional change); accord
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE E CONOMICS OF JUSTICE 25-26 (1983) (arguing that although the
Supreme Court Justices claim to be applying the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution, “in
the hands of the modern judge, the Constitution of 1787 is an essentially fictive construct”).
140 “And the older the bedrock,” Judge Richard Posner noted, “the greater the scope for
manipulation of meaning in the name of historical reconstruction.” POSNER, supra note 28, at 104.
141 Compare DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (elaborating the argument that the Constitution’s meaning does, must, and should evolve), with GARY L. MCDOWELL,
THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
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approaches are methods of shaping and justifying constitutional change.
Indeed, the contemporary ideological “originalism” of the Republican Party
is itself, like so many earlier constitutional rhetorics in the nation’s history,
simply a product of historical context, political conflict, and the ordinary
practice of American constitutional debate. It was inspired and energized by
a political determination to overthrow the Court’s post–New Deal decisions,
and it was quickly embraced by those who assumed that the Founders could
not have supported the modern developments they opposed: gay rights,
income taxes, secularism, labor unionism, racial equality, women’s liberation,
affirmative action, social welfare programs, environmental protection, antidiscrimination laws, and extensive federal regulation of the economy. It was
embraced, in other words, by those who found the rhetoric and values of
market ideologies politically, socially, and economically attractive or at least
useful for their purposes. Ultimately, then, the principal difference between
contemporary ideological “originalism” and “living constitutionalism” lies
only in the formalities each employs and the substantive values their
advocates design them to serve.142
CONCLUSION
In construing Federal Rules 8, 23, and 56, the “expensive delicate ship”143
of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts exposed the intensely ideological bases
of their jurisprudence and demonstrated the “living” nature of the law.
Indeed, the Roberts Court pushed those ideological imperatives into the
realm of the Federal Rules far more extensively and vigorously than the
Rehnquist Court, suggesting that the current conservative majority has
grown even more active and extreme in its determination to infuse into the
law the policies embedded in its market ideologies.144 Although the conservative
(2010) (defending the claim that the Constitution can be understood and properly applied only by
enforcing its original meaning).
142 “Originalism is not an analytic method; it is a rhetoric that can be used to support any
result a judge wants to reach.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 251 (1995). Even
Robert Bork, a self-proclaimed originalist, admitted as much: “History and tradition are very
capacious suitcases,” he explained, “and a judge may find a good deal pleasing to himself packed
into them, if only because he has packed the bags himself.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL S EDUCTION OF THE LAW 119 (1990).
143 W.H. AUDEN, Musée Des Beaux Arts, in COLLECTED POEMS 179, 179 (Edward Mendelson ed., 1991).
144 See Burbank and Farhang, supra note 55, at 1605-06. The view of Justice John M. Harlan,
the Court’s leading and highly respected conservative Justice, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), demonstrates the radical change since the
1980s in what has become judicial “conservatism”: “I simply cannot agree with my Brother Black
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Justices on both Courts proclaimed adherence to judicial methodologies that
supposedly ensured their legal “objectivity,” they steadily and methodically
remade the law to serve the substantive policies and partisan values of the
contemporary Republican “conservatism” from which they sprang.145

that the possibility of ‘frivolous’ claims—if defined simply as claims with no legal merit—warrants
closing the courthouse doors to people” who claim that their constitutional rights have been
violated. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
145 On the persistent disjunction between methodological assertions and judicial judgments,
see, for example, James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia’s “Split Personality,” 16 J.L.
& POL. 231, 378 (2000) (arguing that Scalia “is not the neutral robot he sometimes portrays
himself to be[;]” instead, “[h]is opinions . . . are attempts by him to reach desirable results”);
Stone, supra note 78, at 88 (arguing that “the voting behavior of the very conservative justices
cannot be explained by any commitment to the principal of judicial restraint”); Richard A. Posner,
The Spirit Killeth, but the Letter Giveth Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012, at 18, 23 (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012)) (illustrating the “remarkable elasticity of Scalia and Garner’s [originalist]
methodology”).

